(Second of two parts)
COLD WAR I resulted from the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States over which Great Power would drive the direction of post-World War II Europe. West Berlin was the symbol and the center of the conflict. The interests and the alliances of the contending rivals ensured that the contest would be global. An early defining event in its history established the major Asian front-line. A hot civil war triggered by Communist North Korea’s attack on South Korea, where American troops were still deployed, became international with the UN involvement to defend South Korea and Communist China’s intervention to prevent a North Korean defeat.
Cold War I thus chilled Asia as well. The threat that the Korean War could escalate and turn nuclear helped persuade the protagonists that a Cold War was the preferable option, especially after the Soviet Union acquired its own nuclear armaments and could threaten Mutually Assured Destruction. But a large part of the Asian continent rejected involvement in the conflict. The Asia Africa Bandung Conference in 1955, attended by 29 countries, constituting 54% of the world population, laid the basis for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The cardinal principle of the movement committed its members to avoid participation in American or Soviet military alliances and the subordination of their foreign policies to the interests of the two Great Powers.
Burma (Myanmar), India, Sri-Lanka, and Indonesia were among the organizers, and its most visible leaders included Sukarno, Indonesian host of the conference and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru. The group also included the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an ally of the Soviet Union, thus raising a question about the meaning of “non-alignment” in Cold War I. Now that China stands as one pole of the Cold War II conflict, NAM-oriented Asian members confront a bigger problem.
The US and the Soviet Union have both established a footprint in Asia. Since the Soviet Union fragmented in 2001, Russia has diminished to the economic size of South Korea. Although sometimes caricatured as a big gas station with nuclear weapons, it is still a powerful country, but, like the US, is only distantly present at the continental periphery. Easier for Southeast countries to maintain a policy distance from antagonists who are also far away. The PRC is the rising Asian Power in the East and Southeast Asian neighborhood. The map makes a difference. The 20 countries with which China shares land or maritime boundaries include seven of the ASEAN 10.
Beyond the fact of geography, China had been for thousands of years the dominant power in Asia, rivalled only by India in its civilizational impact. It was the Middle Kingdom, claiming suzerainty over all countries under Heaven, so advanced in state organization, wealth, and military power that it had no interest in bothering with neighboring lands like Luzon, only populated by “snakes and barbarians.” Needing nothing from foreigners, the Empire entertained no missionary or military or mercantile objectives. It graciously accepted tribute from its neighbors and allowed them to partake of its goods and its culture. But poor, enterprising Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia in search of livelihood, eventually sinking roots to settle permanently in the region and to serve as a major avenue for cultural transmission.
This historical context of cultural and blood connections with China and the NAM sympathies made the virtual March 12 summit meeting of the “Quad” (US, Australia, India, Japan) “historic,” as all the participating leaders affirmed. While the agenda covered many issues, including the pandemic, the discussions on Indo-Pacific strategy, cyberattacks, and security issues in the South China Sea, circled the unmentioned dragon in the room.
Japan’s 1947 constitution had “[renounced] war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” It also forbade Japan from maintaining a military organization and acquiring offensive military weapons. These constitutional constraints limited Japan’s participation in the 1990 Gulf War to providing financial support. Efforts to remove these restrictions since the 1990s have not succeeded. The Quad initiative signals the willingness to build up Japan’s defense capabilities. Biden’s meeting on April 16 with Yoshihide Suga, his first with a foreign leader, directly raised the need “to take on the challenges from China… to ensure the future of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Speculation that a robust Quad might be the magnet to pull into its orbit countries like Sri Lanka and Indonesia, who, along with India, had been original NAM advocates, would mark a shift in these countries’ policy perspective. Despite current concerns about the PRC, however, non-alignment in Great Power Cold War II confrontations is still the preferred option for the Asian countries. They want to avoid making a choice between China and the US, not only for ideological consistency in the case of NAM members, nor because of the economic benefits that the China market and Chinese investments bring.
Aligning with the US will obviously earn the enmity of the PRC, with all the concomitant risks. And yet, as Vietnam and the Philippines have experienced, their interests, not to speak of their values, do not conveniently align with those of China. Will a policy of non-alignment suffice to protect them from the aggressive, “wolf warrior” and “sharp power” diplomacy that the PRC has lately been displaying? Non-alignment was easier to preach and practice when the critical Great Power flash point was in Berlin and the Soviet Union was far away.
The core of the Cold War II contest has moved to the South China Sea and Taiwan. Do our leaders, present and prospective, possess the vision, competence and courage to address the potential crises it will bring?
(Part 1 of this piece can be found here Cold War II? — BusinessWorld (https://www.bworldonline.com/cold-war-ii/).)
Edilberto C. De Jesus, PhD is a Senior Research Fellow at the Ateneo School of Government.